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the need for a trial in a kantian court
Throughout history no mere mortal has been more revered and es-
teemed by so many diverse people than Abraham, great patriarch of
the three enduring monotheistic religions. Yet Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam all agree that this man attempted to kill his own, innocent
son, an act so dastardly that it would normally be judged both immoral
and illegal in any civil society. Surprisingly, the scriptures of these three
religious faiths praise Abraham for this very act, justifying it in very dif-
ferent ways, but all portraying it as the paradigm of religious obedience.
In the reasoned opinion of Immanuel Kant, one of the Western phi-
losophers most highly respected by scholars of all three faiths, Abra-
ham’s murderous intent should not be so easily excused.1 Instead of
following the traditional religious interpretations, we should condemn
Abraham and learn from his near fatal mistake. If Abraham really was
1 Kant offers his assessment of Abraham in his classic and oft-misunderstood book, Religion
within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 6:87, 186–87, and in The Conflict of the Faculties, 7:62–65.
Translations of both these texts are from Religion and Rational Theology, ed. Allen W. Wood
and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); all references to
Kant’s writings cite the volume and page numbers of the Akademie Ausgabe, as provided in
the margins of most translations. In what follows, we examine the arguments that give rise
to his negative assessment. That Kant is highly respected among Jewish and Christian phi-
losophers (even those who disagree with his views on religion) is well known. Less known is
the similar appreciation Muslim philosophers have for Kant. The evidence of this interest
was overwhelmingly shown by the Kant conference held in Tehran in November 2004, on
the theme “Two Hundred Years after Kant” (organized by the Department of Philosophy,
Allameh Tabatabaii University). In recent years numerous Iranian philosophers have been
applying various aspects of Kant’s philosophy to Muslim religious and philosophical traditions,
most notably to the ideas of the Iranian philosopher and mystic, Mulla Sadra (ca. 1571–1636).
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responding to God’s command—a possibility raised in the scriptures
of all three faiths—then he must have misunderstood what God wanted
him to do, for no God worthy of worship would command us to break
the moral law and expect us to obey. All three religious faiths agree
with Kant that murder is an immoral act. If God was indeed testing
Abraham, then Kant insists he failed the test: unlike Job (see, e.g., Job
26–31), he did not stand up to God and refuse to accept an unjust
situation. Kant was not opposed to the use of religious figures as par-
adigms of moral behavior, a practice that can be especially instructive
in moral education, but he did not count Abraham worthy to be in-
cluded in a list of such moral exemplars.2
We both deeply admire Kant’s philosophy in nearly all of its appli-
cations and agree with most of his conclusions. However, in this case
we believe Kant may not have done justice to the evidence provided
in the scriptures of the three faiths when they describe Abraham’s rea-
sons for doing what he did. To convey our arguments in a more inter-
esting and persuasive manner, we propose a thought experiment involv-
ing a Kantian courtroom, with Kant himself as prosecuting attorney,
presenting the reasons for condemning Abraham’s act. Presiding over
this crucial case is the Chief Justice, (Kantian) Reason Herself.
Abraham himself, so we imagine, has little ability and no desire to
justify his action rationally, for he is content simply to refer to the voice
that he believes came from God. For reasons that will become clear in
the following sections, proponents of the three faiths are aware that
their hero is in danger of being declared insane (see n. 26, below);
they have therefore sought our assistance in providing Abraham with
a defense that will stand up in a Kantian court. Taking up the role of
Abraham’s defense attorneys, we refute Kant’s charges and show that
they cannot be sustained in light of the testimonies concerning Abra-
ham’s character and motivation that are available in the Jewish Bible,
the Christian New Testament, and the Islamic Koran. As such, our task
will not be to represent the ways various interpreters belonging to each
historical faith have, in fact, interpreted the theological (or other) im-
plications of Abraham’s act. In a courtroom, that would be dismissed
2 In Critique of Practical Reason (5:155–61), immediately preceding the famous “Two things
fill the mind” passage, Kant sets up a detailed thought experiment not unlike the one we
present here, whereby “a ten-year-old boy” becomes, as it were, a jury of one and is asked to
assess various examples of morally exemplary behavior. The goal of the exercise is to train
the boy’s judgment so that his recognition of moral purity will be as “habitual” as discerning
“the difference . . . between the right and the left hand” (155). The thought that Abraham
might be a candidate for exemplifying moral purity never seems to have occurred to Kant,
even though all three religious faiths do, in fact, praise Abraham as an exemplar. The question
is, are there good (Kantian) grounds for doing so?
Three Perspectives on Abraham’s Defense
469
as hearsay. Rather, our focus will be on the material evidence (the
texts) and the operative laws that govern this imagined court (i.e., the
basic principles of Kantian philosophy).3
The jury deciding the outcome of this trial consists (so we imagine)
not of scholars (though scholars may be called upon as expert wit-
nesses to present the facts) but of ordinary, morally conscientious peo-
ple who, though they may or may not be committed to a particular
religious faith, are all sufficiently rational to be able to make assess-
ments within broadly Kantian guidelines. In hopes of persuading the
diverse members of such a jury, bound as they are by the objective
principles of a morally legislated courtroom, we will not assume the
truth of any specific historical faith. However, in the course of presenting
our case, we will refer on occasion to the defendant’s own religious
beliefs, in order to give the jury an accurate understanding of his char-
acter, as assumed, in turn, by each of the three scriptures we are taking
as evidence.
The main goal of this thought experiment will not be to persuade
the jury members to affirm the nonmoral aspects of any of the three
faiths but rather to determine whether Abraham (when we consider
his conduct within the context of each faith in turn) can be acquitted
of the charge of immorality, using Kantian principles alone as a stan-
dard of judgment. If successful in achieving this first goal, a secondary
goal will be to determine whether a Kantian jury would have sufficient
evidence to uphold Abraham as an exemplar of the moral purity that
is the only Kantian indicator of a genuinely religious faith. We do not
claim that Abraham himself could have defended his action in the way
we are attempting nor even that he would have wanted to do so. Abra-
ham might prefer simply to rely on the tenets of his historically con-
tingent faith, including his presumed communication with God, and
let the chips fall where they may. By contrast, we imagine ourselves as
having been employed by the three faiths to reason in whatever (Kant-
3 Our use of various metaphors, comparisons, and other persuasive techniques should not
be taken to imply that past scholars in the three faiths have (or have not) actually employed
such strategies. For an excellent overview of the scholarly interpretations of Abraham’s act
that have been presented in the Jewish and Christian traditions, see Ronald M. Green, Religion
and Moral Reason: A New Method for Comparative Study (New York: Oxford University Press,
1988), esp. chap. 4 (“Revelation and Reason in Biblical Faith: Genesis 22 and Traditional
Judaism”), 77–102, and chap. 5 (“Revelation and Reason in Biblical Faith: Genesis 22 and
Christianity”), 103–29. For a specifically Jewish perspective, see Emil Fackenheim, Encounters
between Judaism and Modern Philosophy (New York: Basic, 1973), 68ff. (“Abraham and the Kan-
tians”). Having asked for advice from and discussed this matter with numerous Muslim schol-
ars, we know of no equivalent summary of the history of Islamic interpretations of Abraham
in English.
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ian) way may be necessary in order to free their shared hero from the
dire consequences of Kant’s charge.
the textual evidence for an indictment
Jews and Christians share the same scriptural source for their accounts
of the incident in question. In Gen. 22:1–10 (NIV) we read:
Some time later God tested Abraham. He said to him, “Abraham!” “Here I
am,” he replied. Then God said, “Take your son, your only son, Isaac, whom
you love, and go to the region of Moriah. Sacrifice him there as a burnt of-
fering on one of the mountains I will tell you about.” Early the next morning
Abraham got up and saddled his donkey. He took with him two of his servants
and his son Isaac. When he had cut enough wood for the burnt offering, he
set out for the place God had told him about. On the third day Abraham
looked up and saw the place in the distance. He said to his servants, “Stay here
with the donkey while I and the boy go over there. We will worship and then
we will come back to you.” Abraham took the wood for the burnt offering and
placed it on his son Isaac, and he himself carried the fire and the knife. As
the two of them went on together, Isaac spoke up and said to his father Abra-
ham, “Father?” “Yes, my son?” Abraham replied. “The fire and wood are here,”
Isaac said, “but where is the lamb for the burnt offering?” Abraham answered,
“God himself will provide the lamb for the burnt offering, my son.” And the
two of them went on together. When they reached the place God had told him
about, Abraham built an altar there and arranged the wood on it. He bound
his son Isaac and laid him on the altar, on top of the wood. Then he reached
out his hand and took the knife to slay his son.
The evidence from the text up to this point (where God intervenes
and prevents Abraham from completing the act) seems incontroverti-
ble: Abraham intended to obey what he believed God had commanded,
even to the point of murdering his own son. The Koran’s account of
this incident (Sura 37:102–11) is shorter and in the opinion of most
interpreters portrays a different son as the near victim, but is no less
explicit with regard to Abraham’s murderous intent:4
When he [presumably Ishmael] grew enough to work with him, he [Abraham]
said, “My son, I see in a dream that I am sacrificing you. What do you think?”
He said, “O my father, do what you are commanded to do. You will find me,
God willing, patient.” They both submitted [to the presumed command of
4 Quotations from the Koran are from Muhammad Asad’s translation, The Message of the
Quran (online at http://www.geocities.com/masad02). Of the various Muslim scholars we
have consulted on matters of Islamic interpretation, we have found most helpful the kind
assistance of Tariq Mahmood Hashmi (lecturer in Islamic studies in the Mus’ab school system,
Lahore, Pakistan) and Abdulaziz A. Sachedina (professor of Islamic studies at the University
of Virginia).
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God], and he put his forehead down (to sacrifice him). We called him: “O
Abraham. You have believed the dream.” We thus reward the righteous. That
was an exacting test indeed. We ransomed him [Ishmael] by substituting an
animal sacrifice. And we preserved his history for subsequent generations. Peace
be upon Abraham. We thus reward the righteous. He is one of our believing
servants.
This text, like the one from Genesis, portrays a man who, by all
appearances, is willfully carrying out an immoral act—in this case,
solely because he has interpreted a dream as a special command God
had given uniquely to him, requiring him to do so. As prosecutor for
this case, Kant would present these two reports to the court as suffi-
cient evidence to proceed with a trial, for, although they differ in sev-
eral important details—details that will influence how we formulate
our case for Abraham’s defense from the different perspectives of each
faith—both accounts contain clear admissions that Abraham acted with
the intent to kill his innocent son.
kant’s case for prosecution
Kant’s basis for seeking to prosecute Abraham’s conduct is two-
pronged: from the theoretical standpoint, the issue is how a person is
able to discern a divine command (as opposed, for example, to a hal-
lucination); from the practical standpoint, what matters is how a per-
son is able to discern a moral imperative. According to Kant no person
(not even Abraham) can set oneself up as a unique case; if justice is
to be done in the Kantian courtroom, each person must submit to
universal laws (both natural and moral) that are accessible to the light
of clear reasoning. Of this there can be no doubt.5
Thinking specifically of Abraham’s case (for he mentions it in a foot-
note), Kant addresses both issues at once in The Conflict of the Faculties
when he writes:
For if God should really speak to a human being, the latter could still never
know that it was God speaking. It is quite impossible for a human being to
apprehend the infinite by his senses, distinguish it from sensible beings, and
be acquainted with it as such.—But in some cases the human being can be sure
5 We must therefore exclude at the outset what is probably the most common argument
used to “justify” Abraham’s act: that he was somehow “different,” “unique,” etc., and can
therefore be excused from following the principles that apply to the rest of us. That even
scholars sometimes appeal to such an excuse (see the reference in n. 28, below) only intensifies
the need for a more rational approach, if religious persons wish to portray Abraham as a
moral hero. For according to Kant (and common sense), a person can be held up as a moral
example only if he or she shares the same nature and is subject to the same laws and limitations
that apply to other people. See Kant, Religion, 6:62–66.
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that the voice he hears is not God’s; for if the voice commands him to do
something contrary to moral law, then no matter how majestic the apparition
may be, and no matter how it may seem to surpass the whole of nature, he
must consider it an illusion.6
Although a person can never know for certain whether a commanding
voice heard inside one’s own head has come from God, Kant is not
rejecting this possibility altogether. Rather, he is reminding religious
believers, or the members of the jury in the present context, that our
theoretical ignorance in such situations makes room for a merely neg-
ative practical principle: a person is free to treat an inner voice as a
divine command, and may obey such a command in the faith that it
expresses God’s will, only if the command can be interpreted as being
at least not immoral. What this means for Abraham’s case is that in a
Kantian court he cannot plead innocent on the grounds that “God told
me to do it!”
On the first (theoretical) issue, discerning the divine as an object of
experience, the problem arises because humans as a species depend
on their senses for knowledge. By means of input from the senses, as
processed by the categories imposed by the human mind, we are able
to obtain reliable knowledge about the empirical world. However, Kant
argues in the Critique of Pure Reason that this limits our possible knowl-
edge to finite objects; we can and do form ideas about the infinite, but
we can never isolate it as a definite object of experience. As a result,
we have no way of distinguishing, through theoretical reasoning alone,
between an illusion whereby a finite object merely seems infinite to us
and an experience of something genuinely infinite.
A simple analogy from the geometry of human vision may illustrate
effectively how this point relates to the story of Abraham. Imagine two
parallel lines, like straight railroad tracks, one being very long (let’s
say, a thousand miles) and the other being infinitely long. A person
standing in a space between and within sight of these lines would see
them as receding to a single “vanishing point.” A human observer who
is far away from either end point of the very long line would have no
idea that the infinite line extends out beyond the end of the finite
line. As a result, a person in that situation would have no way, through
the senses alone, of determining which line was truly infinite and
which line was just very long. A similar problem occurs, Kant argues,
any time a person claims to have an experience of God. The most such
a person can do is to compare the experience with other, obviously finite
experiences (e.g., the tracks on a toy train set) and determine that be-
6 Kant, Conflict of the Faculties, 7:63.
Three Perspectives on Abraham’s Defense
473
cause the former is much greater than the latter, it might have an infi-
nite (cf. supernatural) source. But then again, the appearance of infin-
ity also might be a hallucination, as in the case of the very long line,
or the supernatural source might be not divine but devilish. Thus, hu-
man observers who are faced with a power that is obviously greater
than any ordinary human power are not able to know for sure, through
theoretical (sense-based) reasoning alone, that they have experienced
God. In a word: humans are not able to intuit the infinite (or divine)
in a way that can be conceptualized in order to produce reliable em-
pirical knowledge. This is an incontrovertible principle of the Kantian
court.
If Kant, as prosecuting attorney, had a mind to persuade religious
members of the jury on this first point, he might point out that this
limitation of human observation is acknowledged even within the text
of the Bible. Consider the case of the young Samuel, as told in 1 Sam.
3:1–10. He hears a voice in the dark and assumes it is a human voice,
though in some respects it appears to be more than human, because
as far as Samuel can tell, nobody else is around when he hears it.
Samuel identifies this voice-in-the-dark as God’s only when the priest
tells him. If we assume (with the biblical text) that the priest was cor-
rect in his judgment, then this story shows that even biblical writers
understood this basic principle, that human observers can easily be
fooled when we attempt to identify an experience as being of divine
origin.7
Kant solves the theoretical problem encountered by Samuel and var-
ious other religious heroes (see n. 7) by arguing that in such situations
the limitation of human reason gives us no recourse but to rely on our
7 The story of Samuel could be compared with two famous cases in Christian and Muslim
sacred histories. Saul, the Christian hater, has an unexpected vision of a Jesus-in-the-sky and
is struck not dead but blind; he is then made to see again, as had been foretold (see Acts 9:
1–18). He requires the help of a Christian mentor to interpret this experience to be of divine
origin and becomes a convert, renamed Paul. Similarly, Mohammed encounters Gabriel-in-
the-cave and is uncertain about the character of his vision. Several stories, all consistent with
each other, explain how he comes to believe his experience is of divine origin (Ibn Ishaq,
Sıˆrat Rasuˆl Allah, translated by Alfred Guillaume as The Life of Muhammad [Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1955], 153–55). In one story, he thinks himself possessed and threatens to
kill himself but is stopped by the visionary being. In another, he is alone with his wife, his
wife begins to undress, and the visionary being withdraws, indicating the modesty expected
of a divine being. In a third account, Mohammed’s wife believes he is too good and fair and
just to be tricked by a demon, so she consults with an older Christian acquaintance, and both
agree that Mohammed must have encountered a heavenly being. Like Samuel, Paul and
Mohammed both appear to have become aware of the divine origin of their experiences only
gradually, through appropriate moral reasoning and/or instruction. That is, they had to go
beyond the theoretical standpoint of merely assessing the observation and appeal to a deeper
set of practical criteria, just as Kant argues must always be done in such cases.
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inner awareness of the moral law. Practical reason, Kant believes, has
primacy over theoretical reason, because the moral law is of infinite
value and we are able to discern it (through the inner power of con-
science) and to apply it in practice (through the power of free choice).
No matter how deep Abraham’s faith might have been, he could not
have been theoretically certain that an apparently divine “voice” came
from God, so he had no right to trust it, once it told him to do some-
thing wrong; in a Kantian courtroom, alleged ignorance of this law of
genuine (rational) religion is no excuse, for the moral law is common
to all. Kant would not need to recount all the details of his moral
philosophy if faced with the task of prosecuting Abraham before a jury
of common, morally conscientious citizens. A more persuasive ap-
proach would be to paint with broad strokes a picture of human mo-
rality according to Kantian principles. We shall therefore offer an il-
lustration that presents quite plainly the logic behind one of Kant’s
most controversial theories, his claim that each moral (free) individual
makes a timeless (or “noumenal”) choice to adopt or to reject the moral
law as the primary incentive for his or her actions.
As far as our theoretical reason can determine, we human beings
live together in this world in such a way that we appear to have been
left on our own to decide, through our own reasoning powers, what
practical rules we should impose upon ourselves and each other. That
is, we cannot know for certain whether any God exists, so we also can-
not depend on such a God to tell us directly what is right and what is
wrong. As moral beings, we are free to make this choice, yet this does
not mean we can choose just any rule we wish. To make this point
clearer, Kant the prosecuting attorney might ask the jury to imagine
that all humans who are capable of practical reasoning (where actions
are undertaken in accordance with principles) be stripped of all mem-
ory and understanding of their respective, actual situations and be
given an opportunity to devise rules that will guide them in their in-
teractions with each other. Let it be further supposed that we under-
stand only this much, that all people will relate to each other in terms
of powers, whereby some may be lords and some servants. In such a
situation, each person, thinking alone and from a purely rational (or
noumenal) point of view, ought to choose the identical practical rule to
govern human conduct.
Following this spontaneous and universal line of thinking will re-
quire each of us to reason in this way: I can either accept the rule that
I alone will count in this world, or else I can accept the rule that every
person will count equally. I cannot rationally will that another hold
sway over me, and yet I am aware that I may be destined to be a servant.
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In that situation, I would not want the one who is in a position of
power over me to live by the former rule. In order to maximize the
likelihood of my own well-being, the rule I must therefore choose (as
it were, “timelessly”) is that every person counts equally, for only this
option guarantees that I will count (this being my reason for initially
preferring the other choice), regardless of what power relations may
hold in our actual experience in the phenomenal world. This gives us
the rule: all people are beings of intrinsic value and not objects of
some other person’s value system.8 This practical law that issues forth
from the internal reasoning of each person who is aware of having the
power of free choice is what Kant calls “the moral law” and is the Law
of all laws governing the Kantian courtroom.9
Furthermore, the prosecution continues, we see that human persons
not only conceive of this moral law but also discover we have an innate
respect for it; this leads us to the remarkable recognition of the fact
of our freedom,10 for we have the choice either to conform to this
absolute creation of our own rationality or to use this rationality for
our own benefit first and only then (if convenient) to conform to the
law. Our capacity for this choice, together with our respect for the
moral law, should fill us with an awareness that we are sublime beings,
for this law originates from ourselves, autonomously, as rational crea-
tures. If Kant noticed among the members of the jury some of Abra-
8 Kant the prosecuting attorney might note in his speech to the jury that this rule exhibits
the same elementary reasoning implicitly engaged in by children when they so very early
come to judge morally with their cries of “that’s unfair!” While at first this is naturally prompted
by one’s realization of a personal deprivation—that is, I have been treated unjustly (e.g., have
received too small a portion of a shared treat)—this then expands to represent the reasoning
just described: no person may be treated inequitably, I am a person, and for that reason it
is wrong to give me a smaller portion than the others.
9 This conception of the innate recognition of the moral law conforms quite well to the
suggestion in Gen. 3:22a that we know good and evil just like God does—that is, that in moral
matters we who have become aware of our power of free choice are now God’s equal.
10 Kant’s rather fascinating conception of this “factum” of reason can be explained as
follows. No sane and reasoning person would accept the assertion of John Locke’s famous
“glass man” (see An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [London, 1690], bk. 2, chap.
11, par. 13, entitled “Difference between idiots and madmen”) as a justification for including
among the sciences a study of men who are made out of glass. This is simply an idea that
possessed a madman, although he was entirely rational in all of his actions as a result of his
possession. The idea of freedom should be just as nonsensical to people of science, for it
detracts from the necessity that is requisite for understanding the most elementary experi-
ence—for example, that in spite of how things appear to our senses, things do not actually
get smaller as they move away from us, and fingers do not split as they approach the nose.
(For a more detailed account of Kant’s argument on this point, see Philip Rudisill, “Circles
in the Air,” Kant-Studien 87, no. 2 [1996]: 132–48.) Nevertheless, sane intelligent persons of
science have actually wanted to include in the university the study of freedom (i.e., ethics),
which they would never have been able to do except for the awesome respect they involuntarily
have for the moral law.
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ham’s religious peers, he might argue further that this practical ratio-
nality, not shared by all living beings, can also be regarded as a gift of
God. For this practical rationality (whatever its source) serves as a bea-
con that enables us to recognize God’s presence, at least negatively.
That is, while we cannot recognize God empirically, through the senses,
we are able to recognize when God is absent, through moral awareness.
In a word, we can all be certain that God will not command a person
to break the moral law.
This prepares us to consider Kant’s most explicit condemnation of
Abraham’s immoral conduct. In the footnote attached to the para-
graph quoted above from The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant refers di-
rectly to the case we are considering: “We can use, as an example, the
myth of the sacrifice that Abraham was going to make by butchering
and burning his only son at God’s command (the poor child, without
knowing it, even brought the wood for the fire). Abraham should have
replied to this supposedly divine voice: ‘That I ought not to kill my
good son is quite certain. But that you, this apparition, are God—of
that I am not certain, and never can be, not even if this voice rings
down to me from (visible) heaven.’”11 In Kant’s view the case for the
prosecution is straightforward and requires little argument, once the
laws governing the Kantian court are clearly understood: Abraham
acted immorally because he attempted to do something that all ratio-
nal beings can easily recognize as being contrary to the moral law. Had
he succeeded in killing his son, he would have been guilty of murder
in any civilized society. The fact that he stopped just short of complet-
ing the act does not change the morality of his initial choice one whit;
indeed, in many legal systems he would be guilty of the crimes of at-
tempted murder and/or child endangerment just for going as far as
he did. Practical reason, Kant reminds us by way of summing up the
case for the prosecution, requires us to choose an option that is totally
certain, from the standpoint of human morality, whenever it conflicts
with what can never be more than a mere possibility, as far as our
interpretation of a particular experience of God is concerned. Abra-
ham had every reason to distrust the voice he thought was commanding
him to kill his son, yet he deliberately chose to commit the immoral act
anyway. Regardless of the legal status of the act he eventually aborted,
the jury in this courtroom, Kant concludes, is therefore duty bound to
find Abraham guilty as charged of the immoral choice of intending to
commit murder.
11 Kant, Conflict of the Faculties, 7:63n.
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the case for abraham’s defense: three perspectives
Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard is well known as a critic of
Kant’s interpretation of Abraham’s conduct in nearly murdering his
son. Attacking Kant’s overreliance on ethics, he defends Abraham by
developing a concept of religious faith that requires the believer to
venture out beyond the boundaries of reason into the paradoxical
realm of the absurd.12 The literature on the Kant-Kierkegaard debate
as it relates to Abraham is vast.13 From our point of view, however, this
whole debate is irrelevant, for our goal is to assess how the defenses
implied by the scriptures of each of the three Abrahamic religious
faiths might be used as a basis to justify Abraham’s actions with reasons
that could stand up in the Kantian court, whose basic principles were
summarized in terms comprehensible to a typical jury in the preceding
section. Kierkegaard’s solution may be religiously deeper or more spir-
12 Kierkegaard presents this argument in a book published in 1843 under the pseudonym
Johannes de Silentio, translated by Walter Lowrie as Fear and Trembling (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 1970). For a concise summary of Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the
story, in terms of a “teleological suspension of the ethical,” see Green, Religion and Moral
Reason, 84–86, 89–94, 98–99, 121–27. Green notes that for some Jewish interpreters it is God
more than Abraham who suspends the ethical order for the sake of his higher goal, a goal
that is itself ultimately moral (101). However, “within the Jewish sources, there is not a hint
of Kierkegaard’s interpretation” (102). Even after a thorough sketch of the history of Christian
interpretations, Green can conclude (122) that “Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Genesis 22
is enormously eccentric.” Green says “Kant did not openly condemn Abraham” but implied
his attitude was that of “dangerous religious fanatics” (123), so Kierkegaard was trying to
defend Abraham against Kant (while also reacting to the perversion of Christianity as a state
religion in Denmark). In an interesting twist, Green interprets Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling
as addressing not “normative moral questions” but “the very different ‘transnormative’ or
‘transmoral’ religious question of whether we can count on God’s grace and forgiveness to
help us fulfill our moral destiny” (123). This renders Kierkegaard’s approach far more tra-
ditional than it is often made out to be. Green further argues (124–28) that the hidden target
of Kierkegaard’s cryptic dedication of the book might have been his own overbearing (but
deceased) father, with the message being an entirely moral one: God’s teleological suspension
of the ethical can be the path of grace and forgiveness that can pave the way for our own
ability to be the individuals we are meant to be—a message Green believes is entirely consistent
with morality in its intent. In a nutshell, our defense will attempt a similar demonstration on
behalf of Kant but without appealing to Kierkegaard’s paradoxical approach.
13 See, most notably, the book-length studies by Ronald M. Green (Kierkegaard and Kant:
The Hidden Debt [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992]); and Ulrich Knappe
(Theory and Practice in Kant and Kierkegaard [Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004]). For a collection of
papers on different aspects of the Kant-Kierkegaard relationship, see D. Z. Phillips and Tim-
othy Tessin, eds., Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion (London: Macmillan, 2000). Up to now,
most philosophical studies of Kant’s criticism of Abraham have focused on this contrast
between rational and irrational principles of assessment. Whereas most interpreters who
appeal to Kierkegaard simply accept Kant’s claim that Abraham’s actions cannot be justified
on moral grounds (see, e.g., Murray Rae, “The Risk of Obedience: A Consideration of Kier-
kegaard’s Fear and Trembling,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 1, no. 3 [November
1999], 308ff.), our approach in this essay is to use Kant’s own rational principles to defend
Abraham’s innocence.
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itually profound than anything we will present in what follows, but it
explicitly requires a leap into a whole new way of thinking that goes
beyond the kind of reasoning we, following Kant, wish to preserve here.14
How, then, can we refute the arguments our imaginary Kant has
presented so succinctly in his attempt to persuade the jury of Abra-
ham’s guilt? Could capable attorneys for the defense portray the situ-
ation “on the ground” as being entirely different from what the pros-
ecuting attorney has assumed, although still consistent with what the
texts tell us about Abraham’s inner choices and outward actions lead-
ing up to the moment of would-be execution? In taking up this chal-
lenge, we show that Abraham’s act was justified because he assumed
that no real (enduring) harm could possibly come to his child, for any
harm caused would result in his son’s long-term benefit. In either case,
our goal (by the very nature of our task) will be to demonstrate that
Abraham should be found not guilty of immoral conduct in a Kantian
court.
The Jewish, Christian, and Islamic scriptures offer distinct, though
not entirely incompatible, explanations of why Abraham was not only
morally justified to have responded the way he did to the voice he
interpreted as conveying a command of God but is also worthy of being
honored as an exemplar of moral virtue. In the following three sub-
sections, we examine these “three Abrahams,” using for the sake of
simplicity the abbreviations Abraham-J, Abraham-C, and Abraham-I to
refer, respectively, to the images of Abraham portrayed in the scrip-
tures of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. From each of these three
perspectives, we present a rationale for Abraham’s conduct that is con-
sistent with the evidence presented in the relevant scriptural account
and is designed to persuade a jury consisting of morally attuned in-
quirers that if they abide by the rules of a Kantian court, they must
find Abraham not guilty.
14 Another alternative defense would be to argue that, because Abraham believed he was
certain that God was commanding this act of murder, the principle of forced choice permitted
him to kill his son, lest he himself be condemned for his disobedience. The situation would
then be like two shipwrecked persons who may, without blame, seek to cause each other’s
death because neither one knows how to swim and there is only one life jacket available. But
all this is mere casuistry if we accept Kant’s principle that it is impossible for any human—
including Abraham—to have such certitude. As Kant puts it, we human beings are simply
incapable of having an intuition of the divine that can be processed through the categories
as genuine empirical knowledge. That Kant does leave room for experiences of the divine,
provided we do not claim that they amount to empirical knowledge, is argued at length
throughout Stephen Palmquist’s book, Kant’s Critical Religion: Volume Two of Kant’s System of
Perspectives (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), esp. pt. 4.
Three Perspectives on Abraham’s Defense
479
The “Magician’s Assistant” Defense
Abraham-J knew the appearance of harm was only an illusion.—Our first
attempt to defend Abraham against Kant’s indictment is based on ad-
ditional information found in the Jewish scriptures (e.g., Gen. 18 and
24:1–4) that provides a window into the state of Abraham’s mind at
the time he attempted to obey the allegedly divine command to sac-
rifice his son: he seems to have believed his son could not be killed,
no matter what Abraham might do. Abraham-J knew beyond reason-
able doubt that Isaac, the “miracle child” (born to Sarah when she was
far beyond normal childbearing age), was the only child who could
possibly fulfill God’s promise that Abraham’s offspring would become
a great nation.15 The text clearly implies that when Abraham heard
15 Some Kant scholars might expect the prosecuting attorney to object at this point on the
grounds that the defense is appealing to an article of historical faith that is disallowed by the
principles of the Kantian court. But such an objection would be overruled by an impartial
judge personifying Kantian Reason. For the true source or accuracy of the promise in question
is irrelevant to the point being made. The Genesis account of Abraham’s life clearly and
repeatedly states that he believed God had made this promise, and this fact could be used
in the Kantian court to condemn the person who believes it only if the prosecutor could
show that it impeded Abraham’s moral development in some way (in some way other than
in the case being tried, for the moral status of that deed is precisely what is here in question).
If the defense can show that some positive moral good comes out of such a belief, then the
Kantian court might even praise such a belief! For in Kantian rational religion, the believer’s
choice to believe a dogma or practice a ritual is rejected as harmful “pseudo-service” of God
only if it blocks the person’s moral development. Even nonreligious members of the jury (if
there be any) would therefore have to be advised by Judge Reason to take this belief into
consideration as a fact about Abraham without passing moral judgment on him simply for
holding a nonmoral belief. If the prosecutor further challenges this point, the defense could
point to any number of recent books on Kant that correct the old view that Kant is seeking
to reduce religion to morality. See, e.g., Palmquist, Kant’s Critical Religion, chap. 6.
Incidentally, Ronald M. Green, Religious Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis of Religious
Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 109, provides a helpful tabular summary
showing the basic requirements of Kant’s principles of pure religious reason. Green’s sub-
sequent work, Religion and Moral Reason, carries his project a step further by arguing that
reason itself has a deep structure grounded in moral concerns and by offering explicit guide-
lines on how comparative religious studies can benefit by a focus on this grounding. Green
takes Abraham as the archetypal example (for both the Jewish and Christian faiths) of “divine
command morality” (77). That Abraham has, in fact, been taken this way by the vast majority
of those who regard him as a moral/religious example is incontestable. Green does an ex-
cellent job of considering the various interpretations that have been offered in both of these
traditions. He acknowledges a paradox in his central proposal (77–78), “that an insistence
on the primacy of the divine command is not only permitted by the moral reasoning process
underlying religious belief, but is also a natural outcome of that process.” Along lines similar
to those suggested by Kant himself (though Green does not call attention at this point to
this influence), Green points out (79–80) that interpreting moral norms as God’s commands
lends them power and authority that actively encourage many people to follow them more
completely. He depicts religious systems as imperfect, potentially involving immoral codes
and/or beliefs, and suggests we view them “as evolving rational systems that strain over time
to move toward greater and greater sensitivity to reason’s agenda.” He depicts the Genesis
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God’s command, he immediately realized that God’s promise could
not be fulfilled without Isaac’s life continuing—given that, at the time
of this new command, Isaac had not yet produced a child.16
Another relevant piece of evidence is found in Gen. 18:16–33, where
Abraham pleads with God for the salvation of the city where his uncle,
Lot, happened to live—a city so evil that God had decided to destroy
it. Abraham’s response shows us an important fact about his character:
he was a noble and well-meaning man who believed in giving people
a second chance and was not afraid to stand up and argue against God
in the hope of winning a reprieve for people that God had already
condemned to die. Given this character trait, one cannot reasonably
assume that Abraham seriously believed God would allow his son to
die, otherwise he surely would have argued against the command, just
as he did in this situation. The people of Sodom and Gomorrah, the
text tells us, were utterly corrupt and deserved to die, yet Abraham
came to their defense! How then could he remain silent when com-
manded to destroy with his own hands his innocent son? Far from
pleading with God, as he had done on Lot’s behalf, Abraham goes
22 story as “the hardest case of all for any view stressing the underlying rational and moral
basis of religion” (83). However, Green explicitly focuses “on the postbiblical traditions of
commentary and exegesis rather than on the original ‘meaning’ of the biblical text itself.”
This sets Green’s analysis apart from ours, where the commentaries and opinions (despite
being of interest to and inspiring for the defense attorneys as we prepare our case) are strictly
inadmissible as evidence. Green thinks focusing on the scriptural texts alone is “a mistake”
(83), since many are inconsistent with moral reason, and the subsequent development of
interpretations is what makes the faith tradition itself moral or not. While we agree completely
with the latter assertion, we do not think this renders useless the ongoing attempts of inter-
preters to take a fresh look at the original evidence and attempt to defend it anew, as it were,
“from scratch,” as we are doing here.
16 Green, Religion and Moral Reason (91–92), points out that in the Hebrew mind-set, children
were the property of their parents, so the “moral distance” we (like Kierkegaard) assume
between Abraham and Isaac was not necessarily assumed. Jewish interpreters typically think
of Isaac as having been thirty-seven years old at the time of the incident, and some therefore
assume that he fully participated in the act (92–93), much like the Islamic account portrays
more explicitly. They infer this from the use of “together” in the text and the assumption
that Abraham could not have forced a full-grown adult into such a situation. Green notes
(248, n. 41) that “the rabbis derived this number [37] by reckoning Sarah’s age at the time
of Isaac’s birth and her age at her death, which immediately followed on the Akedah.” If
Isaac was already an adult, then his participation can be seen as an expression of “self-sacrificial
and willing martyrdom” (93). But the focus, typically, is on the hope of those who also face
possible martyrdom, that they (like Isaac) might be spared (98–99). It is worth noting that
if Isaac was old enough to propagate a child at the time of this incident, but had not yet
done so, then the whole event might have been conceived by Abraham as a ritual or rite of
passage, through which God was making a point similar to that made by the long delay in
Sarah’s pregnancy. Or, less flatteringly, Abraham might have been testing God: “If God won’t
let my son be a father, then I shall kill him, thus forcing God to give me a son who will do
so!” But, of course, such possibilities are of no help to the case for Abraham’s defense.
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straightway to “carry out” the command without uttering a single word
on Isaac’s behalf.17
If the portrayal of Abraham in Genesis tells us anything, it is that he
was a man of strong moral resolve, a man whose integrity was part and
parcel of his great faith. He was not a man who blindly obeyed his
impressions of what God had commanded without thinking for himself
about the nature of the command. Given this fact, the only reasonable
explanation for such an apparent contradiction in character in the
story of the sacrifice of Isaac is that Abraham knew full well that his
son would not die. On this interpretation, Abraham was being entirely
sincere when he told his servants (Gen. 22:5) that both he and Isaac
would see them again, when their sacrifice was complete. Kant’s at-
tempt to prosecute Abraham for attempted murder can succeed only
if we assume not only that Abraham had suddenly and inexplicably
become a person who could accept a divine decree of death for his
innocent and beloved son without complaint but also that he lied to
his servants with a straight face, presumably to hide from his son the
sick trick he was about to play on him. The hermeneutic principle of
charity requires us to see Abraham-J in the former way, thus rejecting
Kant’s assumption that Abraham intended to murder his son.18
We can shed some light on the mystery of how a man of such high
moral character could appear to be performing an immoral act by com-
17 Abraham’s faith conforms to most (though perhaps not all) of the seven requirements
for moral religion specified in Green, Religious Reason, 109. Perhaps the chief objection Green’s
table raises against Abraham’s reasoning method is requirement 1a, that “moral obedience
is always in fact rendered to that [moral] law above all else, and to that law in the same form
as given to us by our impartial reason.” Our argument here is that Abraham need not be
depicted (and is not, in fact, depicted in the scriptures of the three religious faiths) as having
violated the moral law, even though it may be true that, with his focal point on faith in God’s
command, he may have appeared at times not to have regarded that law as the highest
principle of moral motivation. The crucial importance of the Genesis 18 passage is that it
illustrates how Abraham does stand up to God when he believes God’s decree to be unjust
or in violation of the moral law! This shows that Abraham did have (at least some of the
time) a proper understanding of the priority of the moral law above all else.
18 Kant as prosecutor might again object at this point by calling to the court’s attention
Abraham’s history of dishonesty. However, this objection should also be overruled. Earlier,
in a test, Abraham had faltered in his faith and told not so much an outright lie as a “half-
truth” to save his life (see n. 21). Presumably by this late date, Abraham had learned his
lesson and was not here undergoing another test for truthfulness. In any case, the text gives
no hint that Abraham was again perverting the truth in this later incident; on the contrary,
what he said to his servant did turn out to be true, and the text portrays Abraham as stating
and fully believing the truth of his claim that they would both return. Similarly, Kant might
refer to the apparently callous act where Abraham sends Ishmael and his mother out to fend
for themselves in the wilderness. But by this point Abraham has witnessed Isaac’s “miracle
birth,” so he knows through experience that God’s (assumed) voice can be trusted. He
therefore believes Ishmael is not in danger but, rather, will prosper.
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paring Abraham-J to a magician’s assistant. The assistant to a magician
who is about to perform a death-defying trick is asked to undertake an
action (e.g., thrusting a sword through a slit in a closed box) that should
result in the death of the participating “victim.” The assistant under-
takes this “murderous” action (or in some cases, submits to the magi-
cian performing the action on her or him) and tries to “kill” the victim
(or submits to being “killed”). Should the trick go wrong and the victim
actually die, the assistant is not to blame but, rather, the magician; the
assistant normally does not understand exactly how the trick works but
merely trusts the magician not to do anything that would cause any real
harm. Despite the appearance of murder, the whole episode is a trick,
and the victim is never in any real danger.19
Something akin to this magician’s assistant scenario must be oper-
ating in Abraham-J’s response to God’s command. For on this account,
Abraham does not even have to know for certain that this is the com-
mand of God. From the point of view of Abraham’s established expe-
rience, the voice telling him to kill his son could be the voice of a
demon; the accurate theoretical identification of the commanding
voice as being God’s does not matter. The only thing that matters is
Abraham’s certainty that the previous promise of God shall not be
thwarted by any being in all of creation, not even by Abraham him-
self.20 This is the heart of the faith Abraham-J has in God: nobody and
nothing can prevent God’s promise from coming to pass.
19 Another illustration would be the friends of the beloved Norse god, Balder, who sought
to kill him, and finally did, but without intending him the least harm. It seems that Balder
was so lovely that all existing things promised his mother never to hurt him, although she
didn’t bother asking the lowly and harmless mistletoe. Balder’s friends would seriously try to
spear him but only to observe how the spears would be deflected. However, one mischievous
god made a spear out of mistletoe, and to everyone’s surprise, this killed Balder. Far from
being charged with murder, the thrower was overcome with grief, as were all his friends. See
Eva Gold, ed., Timeless Truths: Exploring Creation Myths and Dreamtime Stories (Rozelle, Australia:
St. Claire Press, 1997).
20 If this interpretation of Abraham’s mind-set is correct, then Abraham might have been
convinced that even God would not be capable of ending Isaac’s life before he had a child.
The paradox Abraham would have faced is not unlike the one often raised in idle speculations
concerning God’s omnipotence—for example, whether God is capable of making a rock that
is too heavy for even God to pick up. According to Abraham’s way of thinking, God had
pronounced a fact (i.e., that Abraham will become the father of a great nation), confirmed
it through a miracle (i.e., the birth of Isaac by a mother who was long past childbearing age),
then proceeded to command Abraham to do something that would render that future sit-
uation impossible. Obviously, under such circumstances God had no choice but to interrupt
Abraham’s attempt to obey the command. God’s only other option would be to break a
promise, and this is something Abraham knew (and any Kantian jury would be compelled to
agree) could not happen.
For a concise summary of the traditional readings of Genesis 22 in Jewish midrashim, see
Green, Religion and Moral Reason, 87–101. God gives Abraham this trial to allow Abraham “to
Three Perspectives on Abraham’s Defense
483
True, Abraham’s heart is heavy as he climbs the mountain with his
son but not because he knows he is about to commit a murder—for
the death of his son is impossible! Rather, his deep concern is only for
the fear that may overcome his son as he watches his father test his
own faith in God’s promise. Abraham’s reason for not telling the lad
the details of God’s command beforehand is not that he feels guilty
that his son is about to die; rather, the extreme emotional intensity of
this test of faith prompts Abraham-J to temper the intensity of the
experience for his son. Abraham, viewed from the perspective of this
defense, knows full well that he will be stopped, just as the magician’s
assistant knows that the sword will not really kill the would-be victim.
Abraham-J must have given himself some explanation for how this
might happen—perhaps believing the knife would melt into water
upon touching the boy’s flesh or that something equally miraculous
would happen to prevent the killing. On this interpretation, God was
testing Abraham’s dedication to act out the killing to the very best of
his ability and without flinching.21 The safety of his son was never in
question in Abraham’s mind; the only question was whether he, Abra-
ham-J, would pass his test without causing his son to worry unnecessarily.
Summation.—This first defense pictures Abraham as a man of almost
unfathomable confidence in the consistency of God’s promises, a man
who at this mature stage of life is as resolute in his unwillingness to
undertake any immoral act as he is willing to obey God completely. He
is a moral man who would not and did not commit an immoral act,
for he acted in the full assurance that he would not be able to kill his
son, no matter how hard he tried. He knew the test actually would
require him not to kill his son but to proceed unfalteringly, as if he
prove to God the purity of [his] devotion” (87). Knowing that the story would be told to the
whole world, God also wished in this way to demonstrate the rationality of his choice of
Abraham as the father of the chosen people, for God knew Abraham would pass the test
before even giving the command, but we would not have known about Abraham’s faith had
he not gone through the motions (see also 108–9). This explanation is consistent with the
magician’s assistant account, provided here.
21 Abraham may have been humbled by faltering in his faith earlier when in the hands of
the king of Gerar (Gen. 20:1–18). The situation then was similar to that of Abraham when
told by God to sacrifice his son. At the time of his encounter with the king, Abraham had
been promised that he and Sarah would have a child, and if Abraham should die at the hand
of the king, the promise would not have been kept. In true faith Abraham should have
informed the king that it was impossible for the king to take Abraham’s life or to keep him
from fathering a child through Sarah. Instead, Abraham was cowed and in order to save his
skin told the king a “half-truth”: that Sarah was his sister—she was his half-sister but also his
wife! This could account for Abraham’s willingness to go through the motions of slaying his
son without trying to find a way out. From his perspective, he had failed the first test, so he
was determined not to fail again. By this time, Abraham had seen the promise of God validated
through Isaac’s miraculous birth, so his confidence was based as much on sight as on faith.
The Journal of Religion
484
were going to do so, fully anticipating God’s intervention to prevent
the tragedy from actually taking place. On this account, Abraham-J
must have been aware that his obedience would provide his son with
a firsthand experience of God’s faithfulness, so that he too could have
confidence in God’s promise as firm as his father’s, not merely hearsay
based on his parents’ teaching. Abraham-J is therefore a model father,
willing to endure in his heart great personal suffering in order to dem-
onstrate God’s reliability to his child, so that Isaac could also become
an effective apprentice. Once we recognize these obviously moral in-
tentions, we must conclude that the Abraham portrayed in Jewish scrip-
ture is free and clear of Kant’s charges.
The “Sacrificial Lover” Defense
Abraham-C knew no enduring harm would be done.—The case for the de-
fense now looks at Abraham through the evidence of the Christian
scriptures. We begin by noting that the logic of the state of mind of
Abraham-J, just presented, also holds to a large extent for the Chris-
tian.22 Abraham-J serves as a background or context for the distinctively
Christian scriptures to introduce a new element that will modify the
logic of Abraham’s defense. The Christian scriptures (Heb. 11:17–19)
indicate that “By faith Abraham, when God tested him, offered Isaac
as a sacrifice. He who had received the promises was about to sacrifice
his one and only son, even though God had said to him, ‘It is through
Isaac that your offspring will be reckoned.’ Abraham reasoned that
God could raise the dead, and figuratively speaking, he did receive
Isaac back from death.” This new assumption about Abraham’s internal
thought processes requires us to remove from the defense case the
confidence assumed by our previous defense of Abraham, that Isaac
could not possibly be killed. For now, according to the Christian sacred
22 Such overlapping exists between all three of our defenses. This would be even more
pronounced if we were to include evidence not only from the scriptures themselves but also
from other sources within the faiths. Judaism’s rabbinic literature, for example, prefigures
the Christian hope of resurrection as a way of interpreting the Genesis narrative. As Green,
Religion and Moral Reason, 96–97, points out, some rabbis speculate that the knife actually
killed Isaac when it touched his neck, but God resurrected him. On the other hand (104),
“in Christian thinking, the Akedah became the prototype of the Christ event.” Given that
Christ effects God’s forgiveness, and forgiveness is interpreted as a suspension (or at least
diversion) of justice, Christians tend to interpret both it and the Akedah in an extreme way
that requires no moral accountability on Abraham’s part (see 108). Insofar as the Christian
interpretation sees Isaac as prefiguring Christ, the obedient son who willingly allows his father
to sacrifice him, this approach (as we shall see) also overlaps with the Muslim interpretation,
in much the same way that Jewish and Muslim interpretations overlap by focusing on mar-
tyrdom (see n. 16, above).
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history, not only could Isaac die, but Abraham must have expected that
he probably would die, though he would then promptly be resurrected.
This seems to strengthen the case for the prosecution’s charge that
Abraham’s conduct amounted, at the very least, to attempted murder.
Before responding to this charge from the Christian point of view,
we must analyze the common understanding of what constitutes a mur-
der. The normal concept of murder always assumes not only the inten-
tional killing of a person but also the continuing absence of life. If a
would-be killer somehow knew (with theoretical certainty) that the
death caused by killing a person would be followed by a quick resur-
rection, the killing itself would take on a different character; we would
not regard it as a murder—at least, not in any straightforward sense.
By “murder” we always mean acting in a manner that causes a person
to die, with the intent that the person’s death be enduring. To attempt
murder, therefore, means to act with the intent of causing a person to
die and remain dead.
Abraham-C sets out to kill his son, fully expecting to do so, but only
because he is certain that God will then raise Isaac back to life again,
as an undeniable confirmation of God’s promise to bless this special
family.23 Accordingly, we cannot rightly judge Abraham-C to be a mur-
derer. Abraham not only wants his son to live and not die but is fully
confident that if he should happen to die as a result of this act of
obedience to God, he will be speedily resurrected. Evidence for Abra-
ham’s assurance that Isaac’s recovery from death (if any) would be
speedy was already presented in the prosecution’s textual evidence for
indictment: when Abraham told his servants to wait, he explicitly stated
that both he and Isaac would soon return. This indicates that Abraham
had no doubt as to Isaac’s long-term safety and well-being.24 As already
established by the logic of the defense case for Abraham-J, God’s hands
23 Attributing this position to Abraham-C does not prevent a Jewish believer from adopting
a similar interpretation any more than Christians would be prevented from defending Abra-
ham through the magician’s assistant metaphor implied by the Genesis text (see n. 22, above).
The point in using suffixes to distinguish between the three portrayals of Abraham is merely
to acknowledge that the interpretation offered in each of these three subsections is grounded
in the primary scripture of the relevant faith.
24 This point was acknowledged by Christian interpreters as early as Origen (see Green,
Religion and Moral Reason, 107–8), who reasoned that in order to save Abraham from being
an outright liar, we must assume Abraham thought both that he would fulfill God’s command
and that they would both return; the only way to resolve this patent contradiction would be
for Abraham to have believed that his son would be resurrected. In tracing the subsequent
history of Christian theological interpretations from Augustine (108–9) and Aquinas (109–14)
through the early divine command ethicists (114–18) and Reformation theologians (118–21)
to Kierkegaard (121ff.), Green portrays Aquinas as the key figure who first clearly recognized
and tried to harmonize the possible conflict between God’s command and our human un-
derstanding of the moral law.
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were tied by virtue of his own word (see n. 20); Abraham-C would also
naturally assume that God would certainly bring the miracle child back
to life. Although this assumption in itself is nonmoral and reliance on
it admittedly goes beyond the theoretical limits the Kantian court
places on our ability to know whether such a miracle had actually hap-
pened, this does not make the one possessing such a sincere belief
into an immoral person. As his attorneys in a Kantian court, we remind
the jury that what matters is whether the faith commitment held by
Abraham-C, his belief in such a miracle, encouraged or hampered his
ability to obey the moral law. We take no position here on the issue of
whether or not our client really was somehow experiencing God.
As the analogy of the magician’s assistant does not apply here, we
need another analogy to render this version of the defense case more
forceful. The Christian scripture portrays Abraham as a deeply pas-
sionate character, acting toward his son much like a passionate lover
might act toward the beloved after realizing that the beloved is des-
tined to have someone else as his or her highest love. Love stories often
involve the pain of separation, followed by a long-awaited (often vir-
tually miraculous) overcoming of the obstacle that has been keeping
the lovers apart. In one recent Hollywood romance, involving time
travel, the heroine is in love with a man from a previous century; her
modern-day boyfriend knows that if she jumps off the Brooklyn Bridge
at a particular time, she will enter a time warp and be transported back
to her original situation, to be with her true love.25 At first she does
not believe him, but finally the truth dawns on her, and together they
run to the bridge. At just the right moment, with a worried policeman
looking on, she disappears into the time warp just as she falls off the
bridge. The policeman immediately reports a suicide; the (now former)
boyfriend knows the truth, that she has gone back to the previous cen-
tury, where (as the viewer is privileged to see) her true love promptly
proposes marriage.
Abraham, of course, is not in love with Isaac. Nevertheless, his love
is like that of the would-be boyfriend who recognizes that a separation
is necessary for the sake of his beloved. From the perspective of Abra-
ham-C, Isaac must learn to trust God (the true Lover of his soul) more
than his father, even to the point of believing in resurrection from the
dead, before he will become a vessel worthy to fulfill God’s promise of
giving birth to a great nation. With this sacrificial goal of transforming
the focus of his son’s trust firmly in his mind, Abraham escorts his son
up the mountain. In a thoroughly Kantian manner, Abraham-C genu-
25 Kate and Leopold, directed by James Mangold (2001; New York: Miramax Films).
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inely does not know whether God will allow him to follow through with
the commanded killing, yet he does know that if Isaac dies, he will be
immediately resurrected, for otherwise God’s command would be im-
moral, and this could not possibly be the case. He also realizes that in
this way Isaac will then know that God (who raised him from the dead)
should be trusted absolutely, just as his father (who dared to kill him)
had so firmly believed. On this defense, Abraham is taking an extreme
risk as he raises his knife to stab the bound boy: if he turns out to be
wrong (i.e., if that voice was not God’s), then he will indeed be a
murderer, just as the would-be boyfriend in the film would have been
an accessory to suicide, had he been wrong about the time warp on
the Brooklyn Bridge. But in both stories, this possibility is ruled out by
an extraordinary series of events that leads the hero to have no rational
option other than to believe in what would normally seem impossible;
as a result, an action that would normally be condemned as putting
another person’s life at risk is now praised as a self-sacrifice that cou-
rageously provides the key to another person’s self-transformation.
Abraham-C knows that his act might frighten his son for a short time,
and might even cause him some pain, but he is certain that no long-
term harm will be done. Instead, the heroic act is sure to benefit the
apparent victim: one way or another (the details being entirely up to
God), his son would be returning with him down the mountain as a
transformed person, possessing the identical resurrection faith for-
merly held only by his father, a faith based now on personal experience
rather than mere hearsay. Whether Isaac himself dies or some substi-
tute is provided at the last minute will not affect this result, for in the
former case, Abraham-C reasoned, Isaac would surely be resurrected
in time for them to return together to the waiting servants. In this way
we see that Abraham-C, like Abraham-J, is free of the taint of immoral
conduct alleged by Kant’s indictment. He intends and expects no more
harm to Isaac than the sacrificial lover who recognizes that his be-
loved’s highest commitment should not be to himself but to someone
else (in Isaac’s case, to God). For his willingness to sacrifice the posi-
tion of primacy he would have previously held in his son’s eyes, Abra-
ham-C deserves to be honored even in a Kantian court as a paradigm
of pure, painful virtue.26
26 The examples Kant gives of great moral exemplars (see n. 2) are all people who are
willing to endure great suffering rather than do something out of self-interest. That Abra-
ham-C could not have been acting out of self-interest was a feature of the story that was wholly
overlooked by Kant. He apparently neglected the fact that, as Green (Religion and Moral
Reason) concurs, the passage quoted above from Hebrews implies that faithful obedience to
God’s command “cannot ultimately contradict” morality (105–6). James 2:21–23 could be
cited as further evidence of this position from Christian scripture, for Abraham’s act is there
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This way of interpreting Abraham’s conduct enables us to picture
Isaac as entering into a new level of religious self-understanding
through the whole experience: just as his father was willing to sacrifice
his own self-interest (the life of his son, the only empirical evidence
justifying his hope of becoming the father of a great nation) and ended
up suffering the loss of his fatherly priority in his son’s eyes, all for
the sake of his son’s moral growth, so also Isaac is now able to ground
a pure moral faith in his own experience that God’s command can
indeed be trusted. This would be a new realm of existence for Isaac,
characterized by a moral courage that was willing to suffer for the sake
of faith. While not germane to the success of our defense, this helps
us understand why Abraham-C never pleaded with God to spare Isaac’s
life. Abraham-C knew the long-term continuation of his son’s life was
never in serious danger; instead, he foresaw that God was giving Isaac
the opportunity to have his own transforming experience of moral
faith, just as God had given Abraham such opportunities years before.
From the perspective of this defense, Abraham’s response to God’s
command served as a necessary prerequisite for Isaac to carry on the
promise by fathering a child of his own and becoming his child’s moral
exemplar in turn.
Summation.—As in the defense case for Abraham-J, so also for Abra-
ham-C, we have found him to be a moral man, innocent of Kant’s
charge. Admittedly, Abraham-C is apparently in a more precarious po-
sition than Abraham-J, because he in fact is willing to see his son die.
However, his willingness is motivated by a pure trust in the ultimate
goodness of such an act, just as much as in the case of Abraham-J and
with no less morality than that of the most heroic of lovers who is
willing to give up a most desired relationship so that the beloved can
enter into a new dimension of life. As with all love stories, the pas-
sionate and apparently irrational act demonstrating the depth of the
hero’s sacrificial love may seem foolish, if taken out of context, but
when we see it in the context of the love relationship, any normal
human being who places a value on love will appreciate that such ac-
tions in context are universalizable, just as Kantian moral principles
require. What would ordinarily look like an indefensible act of insane
foolishness becomes the basis for a rational hope (e.g., the hope of a
portrayed as an example of how faith must make itself real in action in order to be considered
moral (i.e., in order to be “reckoned as righteousness”). The notion that a believer’s conduct
could be immoral while nevertheless being an authentic expression of religious faith is un-
thinkable to the author of James.
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transformed relationship) when placed into the context of a love story.27
In the case of Abraham-C, his daring deed provided his son with a real
experience of God’s provision and of his father’s love that provided
him with an invaluable opportunity for personal transformation. Abra-
ham-C is therefore exonerated.
The “Good Surgeon” Defense
Abraham-I knew any harm done would be for the son’s benefit.—We turn now
to the Muslim account of Abraham in hopes of formulating a defense
case from that perspective. Of course, none of the three scriptures
gives us more than a few hints about what Abraham’s (or his son’s)
inner motivations or reasoning processes might have been. Neverthe-
less, in a manner not unlike the way the writer of Hebrews seems to
have regarded Abraham as a closet Christian, the Muslim scriptures
appear to treat Abraham as if he were actually Islamic in his under-
standing. Accordingly, the passage from the Koran quoted above treats
Abraham-I and Ishmael as if they knew about, or at least had an in-
tuitive awareness of, the special reward that is granted to all those who
give their lives in obedient submission to God, for as martyrs, such
Muslims are greatly favored by God.
The evidence from the Koran of the importance of martyrdom is
almost as pervasive as is the New Testament evidence that Christians
affirm the resurrection of Jesus. Of the many texts that could be
quoted, the following few examples from the Koran will suffice to il-
lustrate why Muslims tend to view the details of Abraham’s attempted
sacrifice in terms of God’s reward for obedient submission and even
greater reward for martyrdom:
And say not of those who are slain in God’s cause, “They are dead”: nay, they
are alive, but you perceive it not. (2:154)
And thus does their Sustainer answer their prayer: “I shall not lose sight of
the labour of any of you who labours [in My way], be it man or woman: each
of you is an issue of the other. Hence, as for those who forsake the domain of
evil, and are driven from their homelands, and suffer hurt in My cause, and
27 Insanity is the delinking of our rational capacity from our nature as animal beings. To
be insane is to render oneself not responsible, because personality is higher than humanity
as it functions in human nature. So, the worst judgment the Kantian court can pass on
Abraham is to send him to the mental hospital. However, as his attorneys, we are here
attempting to show that such a judgment misses the deeply emotional (animal), other-centered
core of Abraham’s reasoning processes, and that once these are recognized and taken into
account, his action turns out to be eminently moral and thus praiseworthy.
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fight [for it], and are slain—I shall most certainly efface their bad deeds, and
shall most certainly bring them into gardens through which running waters
flow, as a reward from God: for with God is the most beauteous of rewards.”
(3:195)
These and many other passages indicate why it was so natural for Abra-
ham and Ishmael, considered as proto-Muslims, to assume that martyrs
not only end up in paradise but do so immediately, without needing
to await the final Judgment Day.
As we saw from the prosecution’s presentation of textual evidence
at the outset of these proceedings, Abraham-I has a dream and tells it
openly to Ishmael, the son whose mother was Hagar the servant. In
the dream Abraham sees himself killing Ishmael, and upon waking he
appears to be uncertain whether the dream is from God. (In this re-
spect, the attitude Abraham-I has toward his presumed experience of
God is even more closely aligned with Kant’s principle of theoretical
ignorance than that of either Abraham-J or Abraham-C. However, it
bears repeating that Kantian Reason does not require a person of faith
to distrust any alleged experience of God; it requires only that, if
trusted, the believer must use the experience for purposes of moral
improvement.) Abraham-I has reason enough to dismiss his experience
as a mere dream, believing on the basis of his past experience (Sura
21:52–70) that God can speak directly to him. Even though it is merely
a dream, however, he realizes it could be God’s command. The text
portrays Abraham-I as caring most about what the boy, the one who
may have to die, thinks about the dream: if Ishmael believes this dream
was the command of God, and if he is willing to submit to such a
command, then he could die as a martyr and attain paradise immedi-
ately, thus avoiding all the trials and tribulations that pertain to human
life. When Abraham discusses the matter with his son, Ishmael trusts
his father’s judgment so much that he says he will do whatever Abra-
ham decides.
For Muslims, one of the most important traits a person of strong
character must possess is sincerity. Abraham-I exhibits this virtue by
taking advantage of the opportunity made available to him through his
dream to assist his son in having an opportunity to obtain a paradise
of supreme bliss. The Suras quoted above show that, as a good Muslim,
Ishmael would have realized that those who are obedient to God will
be rewarded, and those who give their lives in obedience to God re-
ceive their reward immediately, in the next life. If sincerity is being
tested, then both father and son pass the test without the sacrificial
martyrdom actually needing to be taken to its final completion. To-
gether, they sincerely choose to do what (in the context of Muslim
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conceptions of virtue) they believe to be in the other person’s best
interest. In this sense, the Islamic version has a message similar to that
of the metaphor of the sacrificial lover; however, in this case the focus
is not so much on the hero’s self-sacrificial love (as in the case of
Abraham-C) as on the sincere love and concern each had for the
other’s well-being. Inasmuch as this experience of Abraham-I is the
basis for the Eid, one of the most important Islamic festivals (e.g., it
is the closing celebration for both Ramadan, the month of fasting, and
the Hajj, the ritual pilgrimage to Mecca that each Muslim should make
at least once), we must therefore find a rather different metaphor to
express this virtue.
An illuminating analogy that may help us appreciate what (ideally)
motivates every Muslim (and so also what is assumed to have motivated
Abraham-I) to behave with such deep sincerity (e.g., celebrating the
extreme obedience of Abraham and Ishmael at the sacrifice reenacted
in the Eid festival) is that of a dedicated surgeon who plans to put a
knife into his patient in order to perform an operation that he knows
will benefit the patient. The surgeon’s intention is not to do harm but
to provide the patient with a better life after the surgery. If the patient
inadvertently dies, the surgeon is not called a murderer, for in most
cases the patient has freely chosen to submit to the admittedly hazard-
ous consequences of the knife. Similarly, Abraham-I cannot be viewed
as a murderer, because this judgment utterly contradicts the spirit of
sincerity and love he demonstrates for his child, and his child for him.
Unlike the Jewish and Christian versions of the story, where Isaac ap-
pears to be like a lamb led silently to the slaughter, having no choice
in the matter and (in most interpretations) not even knowing what his
father was planning to do until the last minute, Ishmael controls his
own destiny. Enabling him to decide for himself whether or not to
submit is the only reasonable explanation for Abraham-I having
brought the matter up to his son. Like a good surgeon, Abraham-I
gives Ishmael (his “patient”) the freedom to choose whether or not
the dream should be interpreted as a call to the honorable path of
martyrdom. Far from having the motive of murder, Abraham-I serves
as an example to all parents to give their children, in all sincerity, the
freedom to choose their own destiny—even if the parent (somewhat
like Abraham-C) thereby suffers the risk of losing earthly contact with
the child in order to prepare the way for the child’s higher good.
Summation.—According to this third defense, Abraham’s actions,
while drastic, are the result of an almost superhuman love that Abra-
ham possesses for his son—a feature all three accounts share in differ-
ent ways. What sets Abraham-I apart from the other two would-be ex-
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emplars is his explicit respect for his son’s decision-making capability.
Abraham-I is seen as a good surgeon who simply expresses a willingness
to “operate” on his good son for the sincerely intended good of that
son and with the son’s full and free assent to the procedure. As such,
the jury in a Kantian courtroom would have to acquit Abraham-I on
the grounds that he was serving the best interests of his precious son.
Even if the killing had actually taken place, it would not have been
murder in any ordinary sense of the term, for Ishmael willingly chose
to die, and the death was for his own good.28 Especially when a charge
as serious as attempted murder is in question, the hermeneutic prin-
ciple of charity requires us to adopt the good surgeon explanation and
reject the view of Abraham-I as a mindless, immoral slave, blindly obey-
ing whatever he thinks God is telling him to do.
case review and final judgment
Before sending the jury out to return its verdict, Judge Reason (so we
imagine) reviews the proceedings thus far. In his Religion within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason and The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant has por-
trayed Abraham as the great immoral slave, who wholly misunderstands
the necessarily moral core of all true religion. Kant’s Abraham hears
a familiar voice (a voice he has grown accustomed to interpreting as
God’s) ordering him to commit an obviously immoral act, and without
even reflecting on whether this truly is the voice of God, he hopes to
demonstrate his great zeal by blindly obeying the voice and committing
the dastardly deed. Being misguided in his spirit (adopting an illusory
view of what religion requires), Kant’s Abraham inadvertently becomes
immoral in his heart (and probably also criminal in his conduct); as
such, he would deserve to be punished, not praised. Praising him,
Judge Reason warns, might encourage others who claim to hear God’s
voice commanding an immoral act to imitate Abraham’s blind com-
pliance, not only without blame but even with approbation.
Agreeing to have this case tried in a “Kantian courtroom,” the de-
28 According to Sura 2:128, Abraham-I prays that Ishmael might be the father of a nation.
If God had informed Abraham that Ishmael would be a father, and if Ishmael were without
children at the time of the sacrifice, and if the son of sacrifice were indeed Ishmael (which
is the general consensus of Islamic scholars), then the situation with Abraham-I at the sacrifice
would have to be the same as that of either Abraham-J (where the son would not die) or
Abraham-C (where the son might die but would be immediately resurrected). In any case we
can be certain that Abraham-I believed either that Ishmael would continue to live an earthly
life after the sacrifice (and be strengthened in his faith by that experience) or that Ishmael
would enter immediately into a paradise. Thus, we can conclude that Abraham-I acts for the
benefit of Ishmael.
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fense has accepted the prosecution’s presuppositions about the theo-
retical difficulty of identifying an experience of God and about the
universal moral grounding of all genuine religion. Nevertheless, Abra-
ham’s attorneys have sought to defend him from Kant’s indictment by
examining the scriptural evidence surrounding this famous case as it
is presented in the scriptures of three distinct religions and by inter-
preting these with the help of analogies that can shed light on the
perspective (i.e., the internal reasoning procedure) that each scripture
can be understood as imputing to Abraham. In each of the three al-
ternative readings of this evidence, it turns out that Abraham has not
contravened the most basic Kantian principles, after all, though his
willingness to take his faith to such extremes is undoubtedly beyond
what Kant as prosecuting attorney would recommend as an example
of pure rational religion.
The account offered by each faith’s scripture shows Abraham’s mind-
set to be meritorious, when considered from the perspective assumed
therein. Far from blindly agreeing to murder his son, simply because
God told him to do so, he deals with his son in a conscientious, loving,
and sincere manner. While Abraham’s conduct would be difficult, if
not impossible, to universalize in a Kantian manner—few if any of us
could imagine ourselves doing what Abraham nearly did—the defense
has shown that his mind-set can serve as an example to all believers
within each of the three faiths as well as to nonbelieving parents who
are dedicated to giving their children the best they can.29 None of the
three accounts presents any evidence that the son has any moral
ground for complaint regarding the way his father treated him. In-
stead, according to the explanations provided by the defense, the son’s
behavior in each account confirms that no moral offense was commit-
ted. The father acts on behalf of his son by demonstrating through
firsthand experience how authentic trust in God can lead to moral
transformation through a willingness to endure personal suffering. In
each account the result of the ceremony (for so we now must consider
it) is profoundly successful. The son does not die, does not even ex-
perience significant physical suffering, as far as we know, but is given
the opportunity to experience precisely what Abraham (like any sin-
cere religious believer) counts as being valuable beyond all measure:
the transforming power and gracious provision of God.30
29 For an interesting account of one Christian father’s imaginary experiment in this regard,
see Miroslav Volf, “But I Am Not Abraham—Reflections on Abraham’s Willingness to Offer
Isaac,” Christian Century, February 2, 2000 (online version available at http://www.findarticles
.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/is_4_117/ai_59473700).
30 Although Kant is often read as a philosopher who denies the need (if not the very
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This strategy has enabled the defense to avoid the solution Kierke-
gaard, like many other religious believers, adopted in attempting to
justify Abraham’s conduct: that Abraham was such a special, uniquely
gifted individual that we would be mistaken to attempt to universalize
his conduct by regarding it as a moral example. To take this approach
would be to appeal to a different court, a court where paradox and
mystery are allowed to overrule the weight of reason. Instead, by fo-
cusing on what Abraham’s mind-set appears to have been, the defense
has shown how each scripture does provide a way of understanding
Abraham that satisfies the court’s requirement that morality be uni-
versal in its application. Abraham-J shows his son how to have total
confidence in the mysterious and unpredictable (even miraculous)
workings of God by exemplifying the hard-earned trust that a magi-
cian’s assistant must have in the reliability of the master’s instructions.
Abraham-C encourages his son to believe that God transforms every
apparently hopeless situation by providing new life where death seems
to be the only certainty, just as a lover sometimes has to make a huge
personal sacrifice in order to act in the best interest of the beloved.
And Abraham-I goes even further by allowing his son to participate in
making the final decision as to how they will proceed, just as the good
surgeon does not force a patient onto the operating table without ob-
taining consent. In all three cases, the father deals with the son in
precisely the way every father in that faith would want to have been
treated by his own father, when he was young. All three perspectives
on Abraham’s defense portray him as a shining example to their faith
of what it means to be a good parent and a person of strong moral
character. If the jury sees fit to understand Abraham’s mind-set in the
way the defense claims these scriptural texts have portrayed it, the
Kantian court must find him innocent of the charge of immoral be-
havior—even if Kant the prosecutor ends up leaving the courtroom in
a daze, frustrated that his own principles have been unable to confirm
the severity of his personal bias against this man of faith.
As an aside, Judge Reason now asks: whether or not Abraham’s mind-
set makes him morally innocent, could his conduct nevertheless be
possibility) of divine grace, this is not the generally accepted interpretation of his position
by most scholars working on Kant’s Religion today. Once the old tendency to see Kant as a
moral reductionist is corrected, we are free to see more clearly what should have been obvious
all along: that for Kant some type of divine assistance (i.e., grace) is necessary to preserve
the very integrity of moral reason itself. What Kant denies is not the need for or possibility
of grace but the ability of theoretical reason to discern the precise means God might use to
transmit this grace to us. Of the numerous recent essays and books making this point,
Stephen Palmquist’s article, “The Ethics of Grace: Kant’s Perspectival Solution to the Moral
Problems with Divine Assistance” (forthcoming), delves most deeply into its various facets
and applications.
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regarded as externally wrong—that is, in Kant’s terminology, illegal? If
events had not transpired that persuaded Abraham to believe that God
was stepping in and preventing Abraham from fulfilling the command,
we have to assume that Abraham would actually have killed his son. Is
he not therefore at least guilty of some lesser charge such as attempted
murder or child endangerment? Neither the prosecution nor the de-
fense has considered this possibility here because the case is being
tried in a moral (not a legal) court. Moreover, all three scriptures por-
tray God as intervening and Abraham as not actually doing anything
to harm his child. As such, there would be no hard evidence of any
illegal conduct, even if this had been this court’s concern. The defense
has argued that Abraham knew (or at least, confidently trusted) all
along that no immoral (to say nothing of criminal) act would need to
be committed and that only with this in mind was he willing to take
up a role comparable to that of a magician’s assistant, sacrificial lover,
and/or good surgeon. Considering the report of his compassion for
the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, the defense has assumed that Abra-
ham, consistent in his character, would not have undertaken to treat
his son as he did out of the kind of blind adherence to an immoral
command that the prosecution imputes to him. Leaving aside the legal
issue (for in the end this would depend on the specific legal system
being used to assess Abraham’s action), the jury’s duty is now to decide
the issue of whether or not the Abraham portrayed in the scriptures
of all three monotheistic faiths is morally innocent (and perhaps there-
fore worthy of universal admiration, as a person whose character was
strong and whose subjective certainty of what God would or would not
allow turned out to be right).
On the basis of the evidence and arguments presented, and in light
of Judge Reason’s foregoing summary, the jury in this thought exper-
iment (so we imagine) would require little time to return a verdict of
not guilty. On the more specific question of whether the defense has
succeeded in portraying Abraham as a moral exemplar, we must admit
that the jury (especially if it consists entirely of morally attuned per-
sons) is likely to be split. Those with a commitment to one of the three
specific historical faiths are likely to have been persuaded that Abra-
ham (or at least their Abraham) can serve as just the sort of example
a Kantian demands for a person with historically contingent religious
beliefs. Among those without such commitments, however, some will
surely have remained unconvinced, believing that one or more of the
Abrahams presented had not properly prioritized his faith commit-
ments in relation to his moral duties. One such jury member might
accuse Abraham-I of treating his son as a means rather than an end.
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Another might accuse Abraham-C of letting superstition and the pas-
sion of the moment cloud his reasoning processes. And a third, while
admitting insufficient evidence that the father had shirked his duties,
might accuse Abraham-J of using an ineffective strategy in training
his son to be a morally upstanding believer like himself, blaming
Abraham-J for encouraging the rather dubious moral character Isaac
later exhibited (e.g., in Gen. 26:1–11).
These reservations notwithstanding, we believe that if the jury in this
case accepts the facts of the various scriptural accounts at face value,
a “not guilty” verdict can and should be unanimous. Judge Reason
should therefore declare that Abraham’s conduct, considered purely
on its own merits and in the context assumed by each of the three
scriptural accounts, cannot be condemned as positively immoral. While
this does not require anyone (e.g., Kant) to take Abraham as an exem-
plar of moral heroism, it means that those followers of the three reli-
gious faiths who wish to interpret Abraham in this way are permitted to
do so.
postscript
As a concluding, “postjudgment” note, we can look to the three great
faiths to demonstrate that this moral understanding of Abraham’s mo-
tives is consistent with their core understanding of commands or guid-
ance from God. In John 5 we learn that Jesus refused to wait a period
of time until the sun went down before healing a man but did it as
soon as the need became apparent. In so doing, we are told, he was
“breaking the Sabbath” ( John 5:18) and laid himself open to serious
(and legal) reproach from the religious leaders of the day. David is
reported to have acted similarly in 1 Sam. 21:1–8, when he ate bread
that was designated as holy and set apart for the priests. Yet in both
cases scripture interprets these “illegal” actions as appropriate. The
principle here is clear and fully agrees with Kant’s principle of the
primacy of practical (moral) reasoning over any theoretical interpre-
tation of objective experiences or religious rules: no command of God
(whether it be an inner experience or a written statute) is to be un-
derstood as calling for immoral action, including the immorality of not
doing what is good. The moral trumps all human notions of what God
could say or might have said to any individual or group. All reputed
commands of God are to yield to the moral.31 What we have demon-
31 That religious believers in all three faiths ignore this principle is undeniably true. Our
references in the text show that at least Christianity, and probably also Judaism, has clear
scriptural evidence to support the Kantian principle of the priority of morality over statutory
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strated above is that, if the scriptures of the three great monotheistic
faiths are correct in their portrayals of Abraham’s motives for attempt-
ing to kill his son, then Abraham was not breaking this important Kant-
ian principle but was confirming it.
law. We have searched for a parallel passage from the Koran but without success. Although
Kant believed that only Christianity cherishes this core principle (Religion, 6:52, and Conflict
7:9), we welcome adherents of the other two faiths to prove he was wrong by showing how
Judaism and Islam are not as deeply mired in the priority of statutory obedience as Kant
believed them to be. Kant mentioned Islam only in passing (Religion 6:184n, 193–94, and
Conflict of the Faculties, 7:50n) and with an even less nuanced understanding than his account
of Judaism. He appears to have viewed Islam as an “extortionist” religion because of its
tendency to honor abject submission to God’s command above all else—even above ordinary
conceptions of morality. The topic of this essay, however, is not Kant’s own views on the three
great monotheistic faiths but his view of Abraham. For this reason, we have made no attempt
here to summarize or respond to Kant’s general views on Islam, Christianity, or Judaism.
